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Can Higher Bonuses Lead to Less Effort? 
Incentive Reversal in Teams
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Conventional wisdom suggests that an increase in monetary incentives should induce agents 
to exert higher effort. In this paper, however, we demonstrate that this may not hold in team 
settings. In the context of sequential team production with positive externalities between 
agents, incentive reversal might occur: an increase in monetary incentives (either because 
rewards increase or effort costs decrease) may lead agents to exert lower effort in the 
completion of a joint task – even if agents are fully rational, self-centered money maximizers. 
Herein we discuss this seemingly paradoxical phenomenon and report on two experiments 
that provide supportive evidence. 
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Most economists would presumably agree to the statement that, basically,
economics is all about incentives.1 The statement is regularly understood
to be about monetary payments, in the sense that high monetary rewards
equal strong incentives, and vice versa. This simpliﬁcation applies to many
economic situations. However, it does not necessarily apply to environ-
ments in which individuals interact in groups and their individual rewards
are aﬀected by others’ actions; as it occurs, for example, in team produc-
tion settings. Particularly, in the context of sequential team production,
incentive reversal might occur — even for rational individuals whose main
objective is the maximization of their own monetary income. In this paper,
we illustrate under which circumstances this might happen and report cor-
responding experimental results for the occurrence of the counterintuitive
relationship between monetary incentives and motivation.
Following Winter (2009), who introduced the theoretical foundations for
incentive reversal, we consider simple strategic environments involving team
production with moral hazard. In this context, incentive reversal refers to
situations in which an increase of promised rewards to all team members
results in fewer agents exerting eﬀort. Incentive reversal is caused by the
existence of externalities among peers that arise from the team’s produc-
tion technology, and builds on two properties that are descriptive of many
team environments: i) Some agents have internal information about the
eﬀort level of others (which requires a certain extent of sequencing in the
production process), and ii) agents’ eﬀorts are complements in the team’s
production technology. Given these assumptions, the line of reasoning be-
hind incentive reversal is surprisingly straightforward. Since the underlying
production technology involves complementarity in terms of team members’
eﬀorts, moderate rewards can generate an implicit threat against shirking,
in the sense that agent i chooses to exert eﬀort only if his peer, agent j,
1 A statement which, for example, has been made by Aumann (2006) in his Nobel prize
lecture in 2005. Aumann recounted the following story about Jim Tobin: “The discussion
was freewheeling, and one question that came up was: Can one sum up economics in one
word? Tobin’s answer was ‘yes’; the word is incentives” (p. 351).
2(whose eﬀort is observable by i) has done so as well. A substantial increase
to agent i’s rewards may induce this agent to exert eﬀort as a dominant
strategy (regardless of what agent j is doing). This in turn eliminates the
implicit threat that was present in the outset and induces agent j to shirk
even though his promised reward increased as well. By contrast, if there is
substitution among agents’ eﬀorts, the argument above does not hold. That
is, if the eﬀort of agent i pays oﬀ when agent j is exerting eﬀort as well, it
pays oﬀ even more when agent i expects j to shirk.
Simple as it may seem, it is not clear whether the argument for incentive
reversal is empirically sound on three grounds. First, incentive reversal is
a puzzling and a rather counter-intuitive phenomenon precisely because we
tend to think about monetary incentives and motivation as moving in the
same direction in a fully rational environment. Second, incentive reversal
requires non-trivial backward induction reasoning.2 Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, social preferences (and in particular the presence of reci-
procity) may eliminate the prospects of incentive reversal. Indeed, if an
individual who detects the shirking of his peer is inclined to retaliate by
shirking as well, even if from a strictly monetary standpoint it is rational for
her to exert eﬀort, the observed individual (anticipating reciprocal behavior)
would be reluctant to shirk. In this event, incentive reversal might thus not
be observable.3
Whether incentive reversal in teams actually occurs or not is, of course,
ultimately an empirical question. Moreover, theoretical predictions strongly
2 As Johnson, Camerer, Sen & Rymon (2002) show, na¨ ıve subjects are not likely to
behave in line with backward induction, even when playing with computerized partners
who are known to follow the backward induction path; although with instruction and
practice, subjects learn to follow backward induction reasoning. For other experiments
studying backward induction in multi-stage bargaining games see Harrison & McCabe
(1996), Binmore, McCarthy, Ponti, Samuelson & Shaked (2002), and Carpenter (2003).
Bone, Hey & Suckling (2009) provide evidence that people do not use backward induction
even in non-strategic risky situations.
3 The literature on social dilemmas provides ample evidence that people choose re-
ciprocal strategies even when those entail playing strictly dominated strategies, both
within a round with sequential moves (e.g. Clark & Sefton 2001, Fischbacher, G¨ achter
& Fehr 2001, Falk & Fischbacher 2002) and between periods when the game is repeated
(e.g. Guttman 1986, Fischbacher & G¨ achter 2010).
3rely on having suﬃciently precise knowledge about the shape of the produc-
tion technology, the move structure and information set of each player, as
well as the potential rewards and individuals’ costs of exerting eﬀort. To this
end, we conducted two separate experiments that allowed a suﬃcient degree
of control over these factors to clearly test for incentive reversals. Both ex-
periments involve teams of agents who work on a joint team project. Agents
decide on their individual eﬀort level (with eﬀort being costly) and are paid
as a function of the team’s joint eﬀort. In both experiments we create exper-
imental treatments with either high or low incentives that are susceptible to
incentive reversal. In the ﬁrst experiment, the incentives are manipulated
by changing the costs of exerting eﬀort and in the second experiment by
manipulating the promised rewards.
In order to be able to attribute an incentive reversal eﬀect to the process
described above, we take two diﬀerent approaches. In the ﬁrst experiment,
we add two control treatments that correspond to the experimental treat-
ments in all but one aspect: the subjects choose their actions simultane-
ously rather than sequentially. Thus, while we retain the payoﬀ structure,
the strategic structure which gives rise to incentive reversal is eliminated.
In the second experiment, we use the strategy method instead of the play
method to obtain counterfactual data. Thus, by observing subjects’ deci-
sions in each node of the game tree we can test for incentive reversal by
looking at behavior along the theoretical equilibrium path. Additionally,
we can carry out a direct and clean within-subject analysis of reciprocal
behavior by exploring behavior oﬀ the equilibrium path.
Our experimental data provide clear support for the empirical relevance
of incentive reversal in teams. The increase in rewards in the ﬁrst exper-
iment and the decrease in eﬀort costs in the second experiment cause a
signiﬁcant decline in eﬀort provision. In the ﬁrst experiment, increasing the
second-mover’s rewards has the negative eﬀect of reducing the ﬁrst-mover’s
incentive to exert eﬀort as this agent chooses to free-ride on the second-
mover’s eﬀort. This behavior is prominent in sequential games but not in
simultaneous games — as theory predicts. The average eﬀort provided by
the ﬁrst-movers drops by almost 50 percent when incentives are increased
4under the sequential protocol, whereas the average eﬀort stays constant in
the simultaneous protocol. Incentive reversal is observed in our second ex-
periment as well. The average team output is signiﬁcantly higher under
high costs (i.e., under low incentives) than under low costs. . For example,
ﬁrst-movers’ average eﬀort is increased by almost 130 percent when costs
are increased (i.e., immediate incentives are decreased). Moreover, subjects’
subsequent choices along the equilibrium path are well in line with the pre-
dictions from incentives reversal. Interestingly, this holds true although we
observe some tendency for reciprocal behavior in both treatments, which
underlines the relative importance of incentive reversal in such an environ-
ment.
Our ﬁndings complement the existing literature studying the impact of
monetary incentives on individuals’ behavior. In fact, there is substan-
tial evidence based on laboratory and ﬁeld experiments showing that in-
dividuals’ willingness to exert eﬀort may not monotonically increase with
monetary rewards. For example, parents’ late pickup at daycare centers
turns more severe after imposing a ﬁne on late arrival, and scouts per-
formance in door-to-door collection of donations deteriorates when these
children are oﬀered to keep a share of the raised donations for themselves
(Gneezy & Rustichini 2000a, Gneezy & Rustichini 2000b). Similarly, opt-
ing to ﬁne untrustworthy behavior actually increases such behavior (Fehr &
List 2004, Houser, Xiao, McCabe & Smith 2008).4 These results, however,
build on the behavioral dissonance between intrinsic and extrinsic motiva-
tions (see also Bowles (2009) for a brief overview or Frey & Jegen (2001) for
a comprehensive survey of empirical evidence for motivation crowding-out).
So, while in the instances studied by the above articles it is the absence of
money-maximizing individuals that cause incentives to ‘backﬁre’, the incen-
tives reversal described in our paper is due to the presence of fully rational,
self-centered, money-maximizing individuals.
Along these lines, there exist also some closely related studies that ana-
lyze dysfunctional behavioral responses without relying on the discrepancy
4 See Benabou & Tirole (2006) for an interesting theoretical model that accounts for
the lack of monotonicity between monetary incentives and motivation.
5between intrinsic and extrinsic rewards. For example, Camerer, Babcock,
Loewenstein & Thaler (1997) ﬁnd a negative elasticity of New York City cab-
drivers’ number of working hours with respect to realized earnings per hour.
He argues that this is due to income eﬀects, i.e., drivers having daily income
targets (but see also Farber (2008)and Crawford & Meng (in press)). An-
other example would be Fehr & Schmidt (2004), who demonstrate that in an
environment with multidimensional eﬀort where only one eﬀort dimension is
contractible, piece-rate contracts are outperformed by ﬁxed-wage contracts.
In contrast to our work, however, these studies usually focus on individual
decision problems rather than on team relationships. Moreover, they put
forward diﬀerent reasons for the occurrence of incentive reversal.
To sum up, incentive reversal in teams is an important manifestation of
second (or higher) degree incentives. It highlights the fact that individuals
respond not only to direct incentives but also take into account the incentives
of others with whom they interact. As such, the implications of incentive
reversal go beyond the workplace and the labor market. It applies to a
variety of team environments and suggests that increasing all team members’
stakes in the success of the joint activity may (though not necessarily shall)
be counter eﬀective. Political campaigns, commercial ventures, fundraising
and joint decisions of committees are all relevant environments in which
incentive reversal may emerge.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follow. Section 2 presents the
theoretical framework behind the experimental design. In section 3 we de-
scribe the experimental design of Experiment 1 and the results from this
experiment. Section 4 describes the experimental design and results for
Experiment 2. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework we consider is based on Winter (2009). Winter
(2009) analyses the possibility of incentive reversal in a general theoretical
framework. He shows that when the production technology has positive ex-
ternalities among peers and agents choose sequentially the amount of eﬀort
6that they exert on their individual tasks, the set of agents who exert eﬀort
in (subgame-perfect) equilibrium may decrease if the principal increases the
agents’ rewards. This eﬀect is purely driven by monetary incentives, and is
not caused by behavioral considerations or income eﬀects. Winter’s frame-
work uses a stochastic technology function whereby the probability of success
of a given project increases in the total amount of agents’ eﬀort. Hereby we
provide an illustration of the main intuition behind incentive reversal with a
deterministic technology that is also employed in our experimental design.5
As an example, let us analyze a team of two agents working on a joint
project. The agents choose whether to exert eﬀort or shirk, with eﬀort being
costly. We denote this decision by e, with e = 1 when an agent exerts eﬀort
and e = 0 when he shirks. Agents move sequentially and information is
perfect. Agent i’s payoﬀ function is given by
Ui(e1;e2) = riP(e1 + e2) − eiCi; (1)
where ri is the reward that agent i receives per unit produced, P denotes
the amount of units produced as a function of total eﬀort exerted, and Ci is
agent i’s positive cost of exerting eﬀort. We assume that the function P is
strictly convex on the sum of eﬀort. For the two-agent case being examined
this implies that
P(2) − P(1) > P(1) − P(0); (2)
that is, the technology has complementarities across agents’ eﬀorts since the
eﬀort of one agent increases the marginal productivity of the other agent.
In other words, the technology is such that an agent’s eﬀort creates positive
externalities on the other agent’s productivity.
For the purposes of this example, let us consider the set III of parameters
that we use in our ﬁrst experiment (see below). In particular, suppose
that the rewards are r1 = 28 and r2 = 43, and the costs are C1 = C2 =
1;000. Finally, let us set P(2) = 100, P(1) = 70 and P(0) = 50. For these
5 Our experimental design replaces the probabilistic setup with a deterministic one to
abstract from the possibility that agents’ risk attitudes may aﬀect their choices. A similar
approach is used, for example, in Goerg, Kube & Zultan (2010).
7parameters, there exists a unique Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium whereby on
the equilibrium path both agents choose to exert eﬀort. Thus, total eﬀort
exerted equals 2. Suppose now that the principal increases both agents’
rewards such that r1 = 31 and r2 = 60, with the rest of the parameters
unchanged. Under these new (higher) rewards, exerting eﬀort becomes a
dominant strategy for agent 2. Agent 1 realizes this and chooses to shirk in
equilibrium. Therefore, the increase in rewards for the two agents causes a
decrease in total eﬀort (see the equilibrium prediction in Table 1).
Intuitively, under the scheme with low rewards, agent 1 has to exert eﬀort
to motivate agent 2 to exert eﬀort as well. With high rewards, agent 2 is
willing to exert eﬀort regardless of agent 1’s strategy. This allows agent 1 to
free-ride on agent 2’s eﬀort while saving his own cost associated with exerting
eﬀort. Consequently, shirking becomes agent 1’s equilibrium strategy under
the new incentive scheme. In addition to the particular properties of the
production technology, information about the eﬀort exerted by peers plays
a crucial role for incentive reversal to occur.6 When agent 2 is uninformed of
the strategic choice of agent 1, the sequential game described above basically
turns into a simultaneous game. When rewards are low, both agents shirk
in the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. By contrast, when rewards
are high, agent 1 shirks whereas agent 2 exerts eﬀort, the same equilibrium
strategies of the sequential game. Therefore, while an increase in rewards
causes a decrease of total eﬀort in the sequential game, it causes an increase
of total eﬀort in the simultaneous game.
3 Experiment 1
This section presents the results of the ﬁrst set of tests aimed at establish-
ing how well the theoretical predictions of incentive reversal reﬂect actual
behavior in the laboratory.
6 See Winter (2010) for an analysis of eﬃcient rewards’ schemes for diﬀerent production
technologies and information structures.
83.1 Experimental Design and Procedure
In the experiment, teams of two agents work on a joint project, under either a
simultaneous or sequential protocol. We ran three sessions with a sequential
protocol and two sessions with a simultaneous protocol. Both protocols use
a similar procedure. In each session, twelve subjects were admitted into the
lab and received written instructions, which were then read out aloud by
the experimenter.7
The computerized sessions were conducted at the RatioLab - The Center
for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory at The Hebrew University
of Jerusalem. We recruited 60 students from various academic backgrounds
out of the RatioLab subject pool, which consisted of approximately 3,000
subjects at the time. Throughout the experiment we ensured anonymity
and eﬀectively isolated each subject in a cubicle to minimize any interper-
sonal inﬂuence that could stimulate uniformity of behavior. Communication
among subjects was not allowed throughout the session.
Thirty six subjects participated in 3 sessions in the sequential treatment,
and 24 subjects participated in 2 sessions in the simultaneous treatment. At
the beginning of each session subjects were randomly assigned to a role as
either agent 1 (ﬁrst mover) or agent 2 (second mover). Roles remained
ﬁxed throughout the entire session. At the beginning of each round all
the subjects observed the relevant parameters for that particular round.
The sequential protocol presented the parameters in the form of a game
tree whereas the simultaneous protocol presented the parameters using a
matrix. In the sequential protocol we informed subjects in the role of second
movers of the corresponding ﬁrst mover’s choice before they were able to
choose an option. Otherwise no feedback was given between rounds, so that
ﬁrst movers were informed of the corresponding second mover’s choices only
at the end of the session.In the simultaneous protocol both agents choose
an option without knowing the option chosen by the other agent, with all
7 The instructions included an example with a parameter set diﬀerent from the ones
used in the actual experiment. An English translation of the instructions appears in
the appendix. The original instructions in Hebrew are available from the authors upon
request.
9agents being informed of their partners’ decisions only at the end of the
experimental session. Each session lasted about 45 minutes. Each subject
received a base payment of 300 experimental points at the beginning of each
round (80 experimental points equal NIS 1). Subjects’ subsequent earnings
were determined by their payoﬀs of a randomly selected round. Average
earnings were equal to NIS 63.8
Each experimental session entailed six independent rounds. In each
round, the subjects were (commonly known to be) re-matched in a stranger
design, i.e., with a randomly selected subject. Subjects knew that their de-
cisions and earnings in one round were independent from their decisions in
another round. We used three diﬀerent sets of parameters to generalize our
results beyond a particular speciﬁcation. Each subject played all three sets
of parameters twice over the six rounds, once with low rewards and once
with high rewards, with a diﬀerent partner in each round. The order of the
parameter sets was predetermined and stayed constant in all sessions and
for all subjects.9 This design allows us to examine the behavior of the same
subject as the rewards scheme changes from low to high bonuses, abstracting
from the speciﬁc parameters used in diﬀerent rounds. Table 1 presents all
the parameter sets used in experiment 1 as well as the equilibrium payoﬀs
and strategies for the sequential and simultaneous treatments.
In each session, every subject played all three sets of parameters twice,
once with low rewards and once with high rewards, always with a diﬀerent
partner. The order of the parameter sets was predetermined and stayed
constant in all sessions and for all subjects.
8 This is more than three times the minimum wage in Israel, which was slightly below
NIS 20 at the time we ran the experiment. Therefore, the amounts involved in the experi-
ment are signiﬁcant amounts considering the time the subjects devoted to the experiment.
The current exchange rate is slightly below NIS 3.7 per U.S. dollar.
9 Over the six rounds, subjects played with the three diﬀerent parameter sets (I, II and
III) and two diﬀerent reward schemes (Low, High) in the following order: I-Low, II-High,
III-Low, I-High, II-Low, III-High (cf. Table 1). Notice that no feedback was given between
rounds.
10Table 1: Parameters for Experiment 1.
Set of parameters
I II III
Units produced when total eﬀort equals:
0 30 70 50
1 60 80 70
2 100 100 100
Cost of eﬀort
Agent 1 2,500 1,000 1,000
Agent 2 1,100 400 1,000
Rewards per unit produced
- Low rewards treatment
Agent 1 48 35 28
Agent 2 31 35 43
- High rewards treatment
Agent 1 49 40 31
Agent 2 51 45 60
Equilibrium strategies
Sequential Simultaneous
- Low rewards treatment
Agent 1 e1 = 1 e1 = 0
Agent 2 e1 = 1 e1 = 0
- High rewards treatment
Agent 1 e1 = 0 e1 = 0
Agent 2 e1 = 1 e1 = 1
Equilibrium payoﬀs
Protocol Sequential Simultaneous Sequential Simultaneous Sequential Simultaneous
- Low rewards treatment
Agent 1 2,600 1,740 2,800 2,750 2,100 1,700
Agent 2 2,300 1,230 3,400 2,750 3,600 2,450
- High rewards treatment
Agent 1 3,240 3,240 3,500 3,500 2,470 2,470
Agent 2 2,260 2,260 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500
Note: Equilibrium Payoﬀs include base payment of 300 points given at the beginning of
each round.
113.2 Results
To test for incentive reversal, we ﬁrst compute for each subject the number
of times he chooses to exert eﬀort diﬀerentiating between rounds with high
and low rewards. Figure 1 depicts the average propensity of the subjects to
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0.722 0.759 0.667 0.611 0.167 0.241 0.167 0.537
High reward
Low reward
Figure 1: Experiment 1: Eﬀort decisions
Let us focus ﬁrst on the behavior of subjects in the role of agent 1 de-
picted in the left panel of the ﬁgure. The results show that rewards do not
aﬀect the eﬀort exerted by these subjects in the simultaneous protocol. The
subjects’ mean eﬀort level (0.167) is identical under both protocols. The
mean is thus not substantially diﬀerent from the Nash equilibrium of the
12game, which prescribes that subjects should not exert eﬀort in the simulta-
neous protocol.10
By contrast, the reward structure does aﬀect subjects’ behavior in the
sequential protocol. Here, we observe that ﬁrst-movers are signiﬁcantly more
likely to exert eﬀort in rounds with low rewards compared to rounds with
high rewards (mean of 53.7 percent versus 24.1 percent across the diﬀer-
ent parameter sets; Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test, Z = 2:769, p < 0:01,
two-sided). A repeated-measures model for testing the interaction between
protocol and reward level also reveals a signiﬁcant interaction (F = 7:314,
p < 0:05, two-sided). This eﬀect is not only qualitatively signiﬁcant. It is
also quantitatively important as subjects’ eﬀort more than doubles when re-
wards are low. As eﬀort decisions only diﬀer between the sequential protocol-
low reward treatment and the other three treatments, the higher eﬀort in
this treatment implies signiﬁcant main eﬀects as well (F = 7:314, p < 0:05
for reward level; F = 5:781, p < 0:05 for protocol; both two-sided).11
Let us now turn to the behavior of subjects in the role of agent 2. In
accordance with the theoretical predictions, a large majority of subjects
exerts eﬀort while in the role of agent 2. The mean eﬀort level ranges
from 0.611 (in the sequential protocol with low rewards) to 0.759 (in the
sequential protocol with high rewards). Eﬀort levels seem to be higher in
the high reward rounds, though the diﬀerence in eﬀorts is not statistically
signiﬁcant between high- and low-rewards round.12 We conjecture that this
diﬀerence is caused by the fact that exerting eﬀort is a dominant strategy
for agent 2 when rewards are high, but it is only a best response to agent 1’s
exerting eﬀort when rewards are low. This leads agent 2 to exhibit reciprocal
behavior to agent 1’s strategy only when rewards are low.13
10 The estimated standard error of the proportion is 0.062.
11 These tests are carried for the participants in the role of agent 1, for whom the
model has diﬀerent predictions as a function of the rewards scheme. Analyses for agent
2’s decisions are limited, of course, due to inter-subject dependencies.
12 Strict testing for agent 2 decisions is weak because the observations are not inde-
pendent. If we take subjects as independent observations, we obtain a weakly-signiﬁcant
eﬀect in the sequential treatment (Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test, Z = 1:721, p = 0:085,
two-sided). No signiﬁcant diﬀerence is apparent in the simultaneous treatment, even under
these relaxed assumptions (Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test, Z = 0:574, p = 0:566, two-sided).
13 A likelihood ratio test provides evidence that agent 2’s behavior is highly contingent
13Table 2: Experiment 1: Distribution of Eﬀort and Total Units Produced.
Treatment
Sequential Simultaneous
Amount of team’s total eﬀort Low rewards High rewards Low rewards High rewards
0 17 12 10 10
1 12 30 22 20
2 25 12 4 6
Average number of team’s units produced 79.3 72.6 67.5 69.7
Average team’s payoﬀ 5,037 6,263 4,689 6,170
Average team’s salary paid by principal 6,400 7,224 5,517 6,953
Note: Average team’s payoﬀs include the costs the subjects incurred while choosing to exert
eﬀort. The average team’s salary paid by the principal only takes into account the number of
units produced and the rewards promised for each unit produced.
The observed incentive reversal has interesting implications on total pro-
duction, especially if we keep in mind that the production function is convex.
Table 2 depicts the distribution of total team eﬀort, the average amount of
units produced by the teams and the teams’ average payoﬀs.
Let us ﬁrst focus on the sequential treatments. The table shows that,
when rewards are low, subjects are more likely to coordinate on an extreme
level of eﬀort, whereby total team eﬀort equals 2 or 0. In the low rewards
treatment, teams exert the maximum level of eﬀort over 45 percent of the
time. On the contrary, in the treatment with high rewards incentive reversal
occurs, so that we observe not only a lower average level of eﬀort but also
that a total team eﬀort of one is the most frequent outcome. The diﬀerence
between the two distributions is signiﬁcant (2 = 13:144;p < 0:005).14
The diﬀerence in the level of team eﬀort induced by the rewards scheme
is ampliﬁed by the convex production technology necessary for incentive
reversal to occur. As a consequence of these two eﬀects, the mean number of
units produced by a team when rewards are low is 79.3 compared to a mean
on agent 1’s behavior in the low reward rounds (likelihood ratio equals 17.56 with p <
0:001). This is not the case in the high rewards round (likelihood ratio equals 2.99 with
p > 0:05). Note that these tests treat each observation as independent, so our test statistics
reported here potentially overestimate signiﬁcance levels.
14 The tests on the team statistics reported in the bottom half of Table 2 take the aver-
ages for agent 1 subjects in the Low- and High-rewards rounds as the unit of observation.
Note that each agent 2 subjects is equally represented in the two rewards levels, thus
alleviating the problem of interdependencies.
14production of 72.6 units when rewards are high (Wilcoxon Signed Ranks
test, Z = 2:032, p < 0:05, two-sided). This important diﬀerence in units
produced is not reﬂected in the costs of production faced by the principal.
A team’s average pay equals NIS 75.6 when rewards are low and NIS 88.9
when rewards are high (Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks test, Z = 2:678, p < 0:01,
two-sided). That is, when rewards are high, even though the principal pays
more money overall, she receives a lower amount of units produced. Agents,
on the contrary, are better oﬀ in the high rewards treatment — in addition to
receiving higher rewards they also save the costs of exerting eﬀort (Wilcoxon
Signed-Ranks test, Z = 3:724, p < 0:001, two-sided).
The right panel of Table 2 presents summary statistics for the simulta-
neous treatment. The results in the table show that, as expected, the dif-
ference between the high and low rewards regimes is marginal. If anything,
it seems that higher rewards induce higher eﬀort (Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks
test, Z = 0:789, p = 0:430, two-sided).
Summarizing, the results of Experiment 1 provide clear evidence in sup-
port for incentive reversal. Accordingly, increasing agent 2’s rewards has the
negative eﬀect of reducing agent 1’s incentive to exert eﬀort as this agent
chooses to free-ride on agent 2’s eﬀort. This behavior is prominent in se-
quential games but not in simultaneous games — which suggests that the
incentive reversal eﬀect can indeed be attributed to the process described in
Winter (2010). In particular it rules out considerations of inequality aver-
sion as a potential explanation, because for a given parameter set the payoﬀ
consequences are the same between the simultaneous and the sequential
protocol.
4 Experiment 2
To complement and check for the robustness of the ﬁndings of Experiment
1, we ran an additional experiment which again featured a sequential team
production problem. The new experiment introduced several innovations
compared to Experiment 1. We conducted the experiment in a classroom
environment, in which it was known that all subjects are from the same class
15and are likely to know each other, although the identity of the speciﬁc team
members of each subject was kept unknown. We employed the strategy
method in order to obtain counterfactual data, enabling us to carry out a
direct and clean within-subject analysis of reciprocal attitudes. The decision
was one-shot. Incentive-level treatments were manipulated between subject
groups (i.e., between classrooms), allowing for rigorous analyses at the team
level. The game was framed as a simple monetary game, for which the rules
were provided in the instructions. Contrary to Experiment 1, we did not
explicitly use a speciﬁc game form. Instead, subjects in Experiment 2 had to
extrapolate the game form from the instructions (if they desired to do so).
Thus, applying the model to more than two agents without providing the
subjects the exact game form enables us to study whether incentive reversals
arises in more complex social interactions where higher levels of reasoning
are required. Furthermore, the treatment manipulation is on eﬀort costs,
while the reward schemes are constant across treatments. Thus, incentive
reversal is manifested in higher eﬀorts when the costs change from low to
high (in contrast to Experiment 1, where rewards were manipulated, and
thus incentive reversal resulted in higher eﬀort when rewards were lower).
4.1 Experimental Design and Procedure
Each game consists of a team of n=3 agents. Each team receives an initial
team endowment E of NIS 30 (approximately $8). Agents move sequentially.
Conditional on the decision(s) of the predecessors, each agent i individually
decides whether to exert eﬀort (ei=1) or shirk (ei=0). Shirking is costless,
while exerting eﬀort entails an individual ﬁxed cost ci, which diﬀers across
agents and treatments. The team’s endowment is doubled for each agent
who chooses to exert eﬀort. Note that this is a convex technology, which
implies that it has complementarity on agents’ eﬀorts. The resulting ﬁnal
endowment is equally divided between all the team members at the end of
16Table 3: Experiment 2: Treatments and Equilibrium Predictions




Equilibrium strategies (ND,ND,D) (D,D,D)
Equilibrium Payoﬀs (20,20,15) (20,25,55)
Note: The equilibrium strategies and payoﬀs relate to Nash equilibrium in the
simultaneous game and subgame perfect equilibrium in the sequential game. ND
refers to the strategy of choosing not to double the endowment whereas D refers to
the strategy of choosing to double the endowment.






k=1 ek − ciei (3)
Depending on the cost structure (low or high), the production technology
may lead to incentive reversal. This factor is varied between treatments. The
costs schemes we used were cL = (55, 50, 5) and cH = (60, 55, 25). Since
players move sequentially, when eﬀort costs are high (cH), each agent should
exert eﬀort (i.e., double the team’s endowment) if, and only if, she observes
all previous movers exerting eﬀort. In the unique SPE of the game all agents
choose to exert eﬀort in this treatment. Conversely, when eﬀort costs are
low (cL), it is a dominant strategy for the last mover to exert eﬀort. Solving
the game using backward induction, the ﬁrst two movers then choose ei=0
along the equilibrium path. Thus, incentive reversal occurs: a reduction in
costs (which implies that agents’ potential rewards are increased) leads to a
reduction in overall eﬀorts. Table 3 summarizes the treatment parameters
and the treatments’ equilibrium predictions.
The subjects that participated in this experiment were undergraduate
15 Negative payoﬀs were ignored, so that if for an agent who chose to exert eﬀort the
costs were higher than his ﬁnal share of the endowment, we set his ﬁnal payoﬀs equal to
zero. Subjects knew this feature of the game in advance. Importantly, the restriction that
ﬁnal payoﬀs are non-negative does not alter the equilibrium-prediction of the game.
17students at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. All subjects participated
on the same day, with each group playing only a single treatment. None of
the subjects had participated in our ﬁrst experiment.
The experimenter entered the classroom at the end of the exercise lesson,
and oﬀered the students to participate in a short money-making experiment,
to which most of the students responded positively (78 out of approximately
90). Once only those students who volunteered to participate in the experi-
ment remained in the classroom, the instructions were handed and read out
aloud. Instructions were framed neutrally, avoiding loaded terms (e.g., we
spoke of “doubling the team’s endowment” rather than of exerting eﬀort
or shirking). Subjects then had to answer control questions in order to en-
sure understanding of the instructions. 16 Afterwards, subjects marked their
choices on the designated form. We used the strategy method (Selten 1967),
so that each subject decided for each information set of each role, making
seven decisions in total. Once all forms were collected, the payoﬀs were
calculated in the following way: The participants in each treatment were
randomly assigned to teams of three subjects, and randomly assigned roles
within each team. The decisions corresponding to the assigned role and pre-
vious movers’ decisions determined the team members’ payoﬀs. The subjects
did not receive any feedback regarding the identity or decisions of their team
members. Payoﬀs were made in private and subjects were identiﬁed by the
last four digits of their ID number, which they wrote on the decision sheet.
The average payoﬀ was NIS 24 (approximately $6).
4.2 Results
Table 4 presents all the subjects’ decisions contingent on the previous choices
of the other subjects, as obtained from the strategy method.
Let us ﬁrst focus on the behavior along the equilibrium paths. According
to the theoretical prediction of incentive reversal, ﬁrst movers should shirk
16 An English translation of the instructions appears in the appendix. The original
instructions in Hebrew are available from the authors upon request. Out of the 78 partic-
ipants, 3 students failed to answer correctly the control questionnaire. We removed from
the analysis below these students’ answers, although their inclusion would not qualitatively
change any of the results.
18Table 4: Experiment 2: Description of Subjects’ Chosen Strategies
Low costs
Number of subjects: 38
Percent of Agents 1 D ND
23.7 76.3
Percent of Agents 2 D ND D ND
73.7 26.3 10.5 89.5
Percent of Agents 3 D ND D ND D ND D ND
100.0 0.0 97.4 2.6 97.4 2.6 89.5 10.5
High costs
Number of subjects: 37
Percent of Agents 1 D ND
54.1 45.9
Percent of Agents 2 D ND D ND
81.1 18.9 13.5 86.5
Percent of Agents 3 D ND D ND D ND D ND
94.6 5.4 24.3 75.7 27.0 73.0 2.7 97.3
Note: D represents the decision to double the endowment and ND represents the decision not to
double the endowment.
under low costs, but provide eﬀort under high costs. In support of the
theoretical predictions, we observe that the proportion of subjects who exert
eﬀort as ﬁrst movers when costs are high is signiﬁcantly higher than the
proportion of subjects who do so when costs are low (54.1 percent versus 23.7
percent; 2 = 7:291, p < 0:07, two-sided). Given that the ﬁrst mover shirks
under low costs, also the second mover should do so, which is true for 89.5
percent of all corresponding decisions that we observe. Analogously, under
high costs the second mover should provide eﬀort along the equilibrium path
if he observes the ﬁrst mover exerting eﬀort as well. We observe this behavior
in 81.1 percent of all corresponding cases. Finally, also the choices of the
third-movers along the equilibrium path are well in line with the predictions
from incentives reversal: 89.5 percent (94.6 percent) exert eﬀort under low
(high) costs.
The increased eﬃciency when costs are higher is also evident when we
consider the resulting productivity. Since data were collected using the
strategy method, we do not look at the actual realization but rather at
the expected realizations, i.e., the decisions weighted by the corresponding
19Table 5: Experiment 2: Expected Distribution of Decisions to Double the
Endowment, Costs, and Payoﬀs





Expected number 1.42 1.51
Expected Team Cost (NIS) 30.4 83.1
Expected Team Productivity (NIS) 97.6 127.0
Expected Team Payoﬀ (NIS) 67.2 43.9
Note: The ex-post probabilities reported in the table reﬂect the doubling propor-
tions weighted by the corresponding observed distribution of previous movers deci-
sions. The productivity is the expected ﬁnal endowment in NIS, before deducting
doubling costs.
observed distribution of previous movers’ decisions.17 Table 5 reports the
expected number of subjects choosing to exert eﬀort, as well as the expected
costs and productivity for each treatment.
Similarly to the results in the sequential protocol of Experiment 1, we
observe that with high costs subjects are more likely to coordinate on an
extreme strategy whereby the number of subjects exerting eﬀort is either 0
or 3. In particular, in this treatment the most frequent strategy is for all of
the team’s subjects to exert eﬀort (chosen over 41 percent of the time). O n
the contrary, low costs lead to incentive reversal, because most of the times
only one agent exerts eﬀort while the other two shirk (61.5 percent of the
times).
The convex technology of production ampliﬁes the diﬀerence in teams’
17 For example, in Table 4 we see that under low costs, 23.7 percent of player 1 decide
to exert eﬀort, and 73.7 percent of player 2 state that they want to exert eﬀort if player 1
does, and 100 percent of player 3 would want to exert eﬀort if both the previous players
exerted eﬀort. Therefore, the expected frequency for the case that all three agents in a
team exert eﬀort is given by 0:2370:7371  0:175; as it is displayed in the corresponding
cell in Table 5 (ﬁrst column, fourth row). All the other values in Table 5 are derived
analogously.
20total eﬀort levels between high and low costs treatments when we look at the
expected teams’ costs and productivity. Team productivity is considerably
higher for the high costs treatment (NIS 127) compared to the low costs
treatment (NIS 97.6). That is, a substantial decrease in the associated costs
of production causes a substantial decrease in units produced, a counterin-
tuitive result caused by incentive reversal. As a result, the principal receives
less output but agents’ payoﬀs increase.
4.3 Discussion
The second experiment provides a more comprehensive view of the incentive
reversal phenomenon, as testing the model in small natural groups provides
an appropriate environment to potentially observe social behavior. In addi-
tion, a game with three agents provides more situations in which reciprocity
is not dictated by the monetary incentives.18 Furthermore, using the strat-
egy method enables us to study those situations and identify reciprocal
strategies more clearly. In fact, at those decision nodes where reciprocal
and money-maximizing actions diverge, we observe that some subjects show
a tendency to reciprocate the decisions of the previous mover(s). For ex-
ample, under high costs the last mover frequently exert eﬀort when they
see that at least one of the previous movers exerted eﬀort as well (24.3 per-
cent when the ﬁrst mover exerted eﬀort but the second one did not, and
27 percent when the second mover exerted eﬀort but the ﬁrst one did not).
Another example would be that under high costs, 10.5 percent of the third
movers shirk if both the previous movers shirked as well. The case where
the reciprocal eﬀect is most pronounced is under low costs when the ﬁrst
mover exerted eﬀort. In that case, 73.7 percent of the second movers choose
to exert eﬀort rather than to maximize their monetary payoﬀ by shirking.
Interestingly, however, the same subjects who would reciprocate as second
or third movers do not anticipate this behavior from their partners when
18 In particular, the two-agent case does not allow to disentangle positive reciprocity
from money-maximizing behavior. In Experiment 1, agent 2 always maximize his mone-
tary payoﬀ when he exerts eﬀort after observing agent 1 exerting eﬀort. This no longer
holds when there is a third agent.
21deciding as ﬁrst movers, hence the overall low cooperation and productivity
when costs are low, and the perseverance of the incentive reversal eﬀect.
Taken together, we ﬁnd some evidence for reciprocal behavior in the sec-
ond experiment. Nevertheless, incentive reversal occurs even in this strong
social context. The subjects are not experienced participants recruited from
an existing pool of volunteers, are not used to making money in experiments,
and did not expect to participate in this experiment in advance. Hence, the
created environment implies that monetary oriented motivations are rela-
tively low. On the other hand, the subjects know that their partners in the
experiment are recruited from among their classmates, implying stronger
social preferences than we would expect in a laboratory setting. The cir-
cumstance that the observed social eﬀects are not very strong in our data
hints at the relative importance of reciprocity in this setup. Since some peo-
ple might argue that this setup resembles more an actual work environment,
it further underlines the strength and relevance of incentive reversal. When
salaries are increased, it can happen that agents at the beginning of the
production process free ride on the eﬀort of agents choosing their strategies
at the end of the process.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we report on two experiments designed to directly test for
incentive reversal — the seemingly paradoxical inverse relationship between
monetary rewards and incentives. Importantly, we added to the related
literature by designing an experiment where incentive reversal arises when
agents are fully rational (monetary maximizers) and in the absence of income
eﬀects. Our results provide strong support for the emergence of incentive
reversal. In particular, we observe in both experiments that when rewards
increase (or costs decrease) exerting eﬀort becomes a dominant strategy for
late movers. Therefore, they cannot condition their eﬀort on ﬁrst movers’
actions. As a consequence, ﬁrst movers shirk and free ride on the eﬀort of
late movers.
We believe that the ﬁndings reported here are not only of interest for
22theorists, but also for practitioners. They underline that the introduction of
(additional) incentives, which maybe was well-intentioned in the beginning,
can occasionally backﬁre. For example, granting a pay rise to the workforce
or oﬀering job-training opportunities that reduce workers’ eﬀort costs might
not always lead to an increase in performance. As our results suggest, such
actions which are meant to motivate workers can actually lead to incentive
reversal — resulting in an eﬀort reduction and higher costs to the principal.
While this possibility depends on the exact characteristic of the environment
at hand, principals should be aware of it and consider whether it should be
taken into account in speciﬁc situations.
While incentive reversal is a rational phenomenon, our ﬁndings also have
behavioral implications. Substantial experimental and empirical evidence
reveals the role of reciprocity in teams (e.g. Ichino & Maggi 2000, Fehr &
Fischbacher 2003, Falk & Ichino 2006, Mas & Moretti 2009). Team members
are psychologically reluctant to exert eﬀort or contribute when they detect
shirking by their peers. This reluctance is, in fact, very important for the
functioning of teams, as it generates an implicit threat against shirking. Our
ﬁndings about incentive reversal and in particular the presence of second de-
gree incentives, suggest that high power monetary incentives may be counter
eﬀective as they may destroy this implicit threat. This form of behavioral
incentive reversal, which shares the very same logic of our fully rational
incentive reversal is applicable to almost any team environment without re-
lying on complementarity among agents. Therefore, it is important to take
it into account when designing incentive schemes for teams.
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26A Appendix A: Instructions for Experiment 2
(The costs and payments correspond to the low-costs condition.)
Instructions
In this experiment, we will let you play a game for three participants:
Participant 1, Participant 2, and Participant 3. In the game, you may win
money, as explained below.
Rules of the Game
The three participants in the game constitute a group. A budget of NIS
30 is made available to the group. Each participant, in turn, may choose
to double the group’s budget for a certain price that he or she will pay at
the end of the game. Participant 1 decides ﬁrst, followed by Participant
2 and ﬁnally Participant 3. Each participant knows what the preceding
participants have chosen.
At the end of the game, the ﬁnal budget is divided equally among the
three members of the group, and the member who chose to double it will
pay the price of his or her decision from his or her share.
The following table shows the participants’ payments in accordance with
their decisions. Note that if a participant chooses to double the budget, his
or her ﬁnal proﬁt will be his or her share in the budget (in accordance with
the table) less the price of having doubled the budget (not shown in the
table).
Number of participants Budget obtained Each participant’s share
who choose to double in the budget
the budget
0 NIS 30 NIS 10
1 NIS 60 NIS 20
2 NIS 120 NIS 40
3 NIS 240 NIS 80
The prices that each participant must pay for doubling the budget are
the following:
Participant 1: NIS 55 Participant 2: NIS 50 Participant 3: NIS 5
For example, if all members of the group decide not to double the budget,
27each member will be left with NIS 10. If all of members decide to double
the budget, each member will accumulate NIS 80, from which the price of
having doubled the budget will be subtracted at the end, ultimately leaving
Participant 1 with NIS 25, Participant 2 with NIS 30, and Participant 3
with NIS 75.
If a participant is left with a negative sum at the end of the
game, he or she will not have to pay anything; he or she will simply
remain with 0.
How the experiment will take place
We will be handing out a sheet of paper. On one side of the sheet, you are
asked to record your decisions. On the other side, several questions appear,
the purpose of which is to make sure that you understood the instructions.
If you fail to answer these questions correctly, we will not be able
to take your data into account and, accordingly, you will not be
paid.
You must decide what you would do in the ”shoes” of each participant
and record your decision on the page. After we collect all the pages, we
will aggregate them randomly into three-person groups and conduct a draw
within each group to determine who will be Participant 1, who will be Par-
ticipant 2, and who will be Participant 3. Then we will play the game, in
such a way each participant will play on the basis of what he or she recorded
on the page. In this manner, each player’s earnings will be determined.
For us to pay you what you are owed, you must record the last four
digits of your ID number in the appropriate place on the page. We will use
this information to identify you in order to pay you.
After you record your decision on the page, please return both pages to
the experimenter. Thank you for participating in the experiment!
28B Appendix B: Decision sheet for Experiment 2
ID no:
Please record your decision in each of the following cases:
If I am Participant 1, I will choose:
⃝ To double the sums to NIS 20 per person, and then it is Participant 2’s turn.
⃝ To leave the sums at NIS 10 per person, and then it is Participant 2’s turn.
If I am Participant 2, then...
If Participant 1 chooses not to double the budget, I will choose:
⃝ To double the sums to NIS 20 per person, and then it is Participant 3’s turn.
⃝ To leave the sums at NIS 10 per person, and then it is Participant 3’s turn.
If Participant 1 chooses to double the budget, I will choose:
⃝ To double the sums to NIS 40 per person, and then it is Participant 3’s turn.
⃝ To leave the sums at NIS 20 per person, and then it is Participant 3’s turn.
If I am Participant 3, then...
If the two previous participants choose not to double the budget, I will choose:
⃝ To double the sums to NIS 20 per person, and then the game ends.
⃝ To leave the sums at NIS 10 per person, and then the game ends.
If only Participant 1 chooses to double the budget, I will choose:
⃝ To double the sums to NIS 40 per person, and then the game ends.
⃝ To leave the sums at NIS 20 per person, and then the game ends.
If only Participant 2 chooses to double the budget, I will choose:
⃝ To double the sums to NIS 40 per person, and then the game ends.
⃝ To leave the sums at NIS 20 per person, and then the game ends.
If both of the previous participants choose to double the budget, I will choose:
⃝ To double the sums to NIS 80 per person, and then the game ends.
⃝ To leave the sums at NIS 20 per person, and then the game ends.
29C Appendix C: Control Questions for Experiment
2
Please answer the following questions: Reminder: the price of doubling the budget
is NIS 55 for Participant 1, NIS 50 for Participant 2, and NIS 5 for Participant 3.
1. How much will each participant ultimately receive if Participant 1 chooses to double the budget,
Participant 2 chooses not to double it, and Participant 3 chooses to double it?
Participant 1 will receive NIS .
Participant 2 will receive NIS .
Participant 3 will receive NIS .
2. How much will each participant ultimately receive if Participant 1 chooses not to double the
budget, Participant 2 chooses to double it, and Participant 3 chooses not to double it?
Participant 1 will receive NIS .
Participant 2 will receive NIS .
Participant 3 will receive NIS .
3. How much will each participant ultimately receive if Participant 1 chooses not to double the
budget, Participant 2 chooses to double it, and Participant 3 chooses to double it?
Participant 1 will receive NIS .
Participant 2 will receive NIS .
Participant 3 will receive NIS .
4. How much will each participant ultimately receive if Participant 1 chooses not to double the
budget, Participant 2 chooses to not double it, and Participant 3 chooses to double it?
Participant 1 will receive NIS .
Participant 2 will receive NIS .
Participant 3 will receive NIS .
30